Critical Legal Data Classification Level Standards for Software Policies
The purpose of classification is to protect information. Higher classifications protect information that might endanger national security. Classification formalises what constitutes a “state secret” and accords different levels of protection based on the expected damage the information might cause in the wrong hands.
However, classified information is frequently “leaked” to reporters by officials for political purposes. Several U.S. presidents have leaked sensitive information to get their point across to the public. A formal security clearance is required to view or handle classified documents or to access classified data. The clearance process requires a satisfactory background investigation. Documents and other information must be properly marked “by the author” with one of several (hierarchical) levels of sensitivity — e.g. restricted, confidential, secret and top secret. The choice of level is based on an impact assessment; governments have their own criteria, which include how to determine the classification of an information asset, and rules on how to protect information classified at each level. This often includes security clearances for personnel handling the information. Although “classified information” refers to the formal categorization and marking of material by level of sensitivity, it has also developed a sense synonymous with “censored” in US English. A distinction is often made between formal security classification and privacy markings such as “commercial in confidence”. Classifications can be used with additional keywords that give more detailed instructions on how data should be used or protected. Some corporations and non-government organizations also assign levels of protection to their private information, either from a desire to protect trade secrets, or because of laws and regulations governing various matters such as personal privacy, sealed legal proceedings and the timing of financial information releases. With the passage of time much classified information can become a bit less sensitive, or becomes much less sensitive, and may be declassified and made public. Since the late twentieth century there has been freedom of information legislation in some countries, whereby the public is deemed to have the right to all information that is not considered to be damaging if released. Sometimes documents are released with information still considered confidential obscured (redacted), as in the adjacent example. The question exists among some political science and legal experts, whether the definition of classified ought to be information that would cause injury to the cause of justice, human rights, etc., rather than information that would cause injury to the national interest, to distinguish when classifying information is in the collective best interest of a just society or merely the best interest of a society acting unjustly, to protect its people, government, or administrative officials from legitimate recourses consistent with a fair and just social contract.
A classification level must be assigned to information when that information is determined to be classified. A classification level indicates the relative importance of classified information to national security and thereby determines the specific security requirements applicable to that information. Clearly defined classification levels are essential to an effective classification system.1
The U.S. classification of information system has three classification levels — Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential — which are defined in EO 12356.2 Those levels are used both for NSI and atomic energy information (RD and FRD). Section 1.1(a) of EO 12356 states that:
(a) National Security Information (hereinafter “classified information”) shall be classified at one of the following three levels:
(1) “Top Secret” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
(2) “Secret” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.
(3) “Confidential” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.
Section 1.1(b) of EO 12356 states that “except as otherwise provided by statute, no other terms shall be used to identify classified information.”
Previous chapters that discussed classification principles emphasized the need to balance the risks of information disclosure (damage to national security) against the benefits of having the information unclassified. If disclosure of information causes net damage to the nation, then that information should at least be classified at the Confidential level. However, there is very little available guidance to help determine which classification level should be assigned to classified information (i.e., whether it should be classified as Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret).
The appropriate classification level would be expected to usually be determined by the information disclosure risks because those risks largely determine the magnitude of the net damage that could be caused by such disclosure.* Generally, the benefits of information disclosure are expected to be on the order of magnitude of the Confidential level of damage. Therefore, the difficult balancing situations will usually occur when information disclosure damage is at the Confidential level because then the benefits and risks are expected to be about equal. When information disclosure risks are at the serious or extremely grave levels associated with Secret or Top Secret information, respectively, then the classification levels would usually be expected to be determined solely by those damages. It would be rare that the information disclosure benefits would approximate those significantly higher serious or extremely grave damage levels. The following sections of this chapter provide discussions of the three classification levels, especially with respect to scientific or technical information. Principles are proposed for assigning classification levels.
- The discussion assumes that the three classification levels — Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret — differ from each other by about an order of magnitude (factor of 10). That is, disclosure of Secret information would cause about ten times as much damage as disclosure of Confidential information, and disclosure of Top Secret information would cause about ten times as much damage as disclosure of Secret information. This assumption appears to be a realistic approach because of the difficulties in determining information disclosure damages very accurately and the consequent necessity to have significant differences in the assigned Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential damage levels.
Classification Level Definitions and Examples
Top Secret Information
EO 12356 states that the Top Secret classification level “shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.”3
It is of interest, prior to discussing specific examples of what might be Top Secret information, to examine the definitions of some of the terms used by the EO to describe Top Secret information. The key terms and their definitions are as follows:4
Reasonable — being in agreement with right thinking or right judgment; not conflicting with reason; not absurd; not ridiculous; being or remaining within the bounds of reason; not extreme; not excessive; moderate; not expensive; having the faculty of reason; possessing good sound judgment; well balanced; sensible.
- Could — past tense of can.
- Can — to be able to do, make, or accomplish.
- Expect — suppose, think, believe; to consider probable or certain; to consider reasonable, just, proper, due, or necessary.
- Cause — a person, thing, fact, or condition that brings about an effect or that produces or calls forth a resultant action or state; something that occasions or effects a result; the necessary antecedent of an effect.
- Exceptional — forming an exception; being out of the ordinary; uncommon, rare.
- Grave — involving or resulting in serious consequences; likely to produce real harm or damage; very serious.
- Damage — loss due to injury; injury or harm to person, property, or reputation; hurt; harm.
The last EO to provide examples of Top Secret information whose disclosure “could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security” was EO 11652 of March 1972.5 Examples of “exceptionally grave damage” included in that EO were “armed hostilities against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the national security; the compromise of vital defense plans or complex cryptologic and communications intelligence systems; the revelation of sensitive intelligence operations; and the disclosure of scientific or technical developments vital to national security.”6 Subsequent EOs have not provided examples of what constitutes Top Secret information.
Examples of Top Secret information are currently given in National Security Council (NSC) regulations concerning FOIA requests for classified documents. Those examples are “armed hostilities against the United States or its allies,” “disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the national security,” “the compromise of vital national defense plans or complex cryptologic and communications intelligence systems,” “the revelation of sensitive intelligence operations,” and “the disclosure of scientific or technological developments vital to the national security.”7 Those examples in NSC regulations are the same those used in EO 11652 and are also found in the DoD Information Security Program Regulations.8 A 1964 DoD instruction provided more-detailed examples of information that might require Top Secret classification. Some of those examples are as follows:
(1) A strategic plan documenting the overall conduct of a war.
(2) War planning documents which contain worldwide —
(a) Planning data and assumptions,
(b) Wartime planning factors for the use of nuclear weapons,
(c) Intelligence estimates of enemy capabilities,
(d) Force composition and development, and
(e) Real estate requirements and utilization by geographical area which are time-phased for a period of months.
(3) An operations plan either for a single operation or a series of connected operations containing any of the factors in (2) above and with sortie rates or target data.
(5) Intelligence documents that contain completed intelligence of such scope that it reveals a major intelligence production effort on the part of the United States and which would permit an evaluation by unauthorized recipients of the success attained by, or the capabilities of, the United States intelligence services.
(6) A plan or policy for conducting intelligence or other special operations and information revealing a particular intelligence operation or other special operation, provided that the compromise of such plan, policy, or particular operation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Intelligence operations may include certain specifically designated and controlled collection projects.
(7) Vital information concerning radically new and extremely important equipment (munitions of war), such as nuclear weapons, atomic weapons stockpile data, and any other munitions of comparable importance the scientific or technological development aspects of which are vital to national defense.9
There is very little classified atomic energy information (RD or FRD) that is assigned a Top Secret classification level by the DOE. Most RD and FRD are classified at either the Confidential or Secret levels. Although some other federal agencies (e.g., DoD) use the Top Secret classification level much more frequently than does DOE, within the entire U.S. Government only 4% of the original classification decisions made in FY 1991 were assigned a Top Secret classification level.*
- There were an estimated 511,868 original classification decisions by executive agencies in FY 1991. Of those decisions, 4% were Top Secret, 57% were Secret, and 39% were Confidential [“Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) 1991 Report to the President,” Information Security Oversight Office, Wash., D.C., March 1992, p. 12]. There were an estimated 6,595,149 derivative classification decisions by executive agencies in FY 1991. Of those decisions, 8% were Top Secret, 74% were Secret, and 18% were Confidential [ibid., p. 15]. The higher percentage of original classification decisions at the Confidential level, as compared with the percentage of derivative classification decisions at that level, is attributed to the fact that the Department of State treats all of its classification decisions as original and classifies most of these (80%) at the Confidential level [ibid., p. 16].
The Secret classification level “shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.”10
The definitions of most of the important terms used by EO 12356 to describe the Secret classification level were given earlier. Only the following definition needs to be given here:
Serious — important; significant; emphatic; such as to call forth strong measures for combatting or rectifying; such as to cause considerable distress, anxiety, or inconvenience; attended with danger.4
Examples of Secret information were given in EO 11652. Secret information, as defined in that EO, “could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security,” and examples were stated to include “disruption of foreign relations significantly affecting the national security; significant impairment of a program or policy directly related to the national security; revelation of significant military plans or intelligence operations; and compromise of significant scientific or technological developments relating to national security.” Examples of Secret information given in current NSC regulations are “disruption of foreign relations significantly affecting the national security,” “significant impairment of a program or policy directly related to the national security,” “revelation of significant military plans or intelligence operations,” and “compromise of significant scientific or technological developments relating to national security.”12 Again, the NSC examples are the same as the EO 11652 examples and the same as in the DoD Information Security Program Regulations.13 A 1964 DoD instruction provided more-detailed examples of information that might require Secret classification. Some of those examples are as follows:
(1) A war plan or a complete plan for a future operation of war not included under TOP SECRET, and documents showing the disposition of our forces the unauthorized disclosure of which, standing alone, could result in actual compromise of such SECRET plans.
(2) Defense or other military plans not included under TOP SECRET or (1) above including certain development and procurement plans and programs but not necessarily including all emergency plans.
(3) Specific information which, standing alone, reveals the military capabilities or state of preparedness of the Armed Forces, but not including information the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in compromise of a TOP SECRET plan.
(4) Information that reveals the strength of our forces engaged in hostilities; quantities or nature of their equipment; or the identity or composition of units in an active theater of operations or other geographic area where our forces are engaged in hostilities, except that mailing addresses may include organization designation. Information which reveals the strength, identity, composition, or location of units normally requires classification as SECRET in time of war. In peacetime SECRET classification of information pertaining to units may be appropriate when related to war plans, estimates or deployments which involve classified information.
(5) Intelligence and other information, the value of which depends upon concealing the fact that the United States possesses it, except when possession of intelligence or other information concomitantly discloses a particular intelligence or other special operation falling within [the TOP SECRET classification level].
(6) Particulars of scientific or research projects which incorporate new technological developments or techniques having direct military applications of vital importance to the national defense.
(7) Specific details or data relating to new materials or important modifications of materials which reveal significant military advances or new technological developments having direct military application of vital importance to the national defense.
(8) Information of vital importance to the national defense concerning specific quantities of war reserves.
(9) Indications of weakness, e.g., shortages of significant or sensitive items of equipment.14
The distinction between Secret and Top Secret information appears to be that Top Secret information is “vital,” whereas Secret information is only “significant.” See below in this chapter for a further discussion of the difference between Secret and Top Secret information.
Of interest with respect to DOE classification matters are some examples of Secret information given in a 1945 Manhattan Engineering District (MED) Security Manual.15 Some of those examples are as follows.
(1) Documents containing specific design details (diagrammatic or descriptive) of complete basic or key equipment, apparatus, instruments, or machinery employed in a critical stage of the processing and production of end products, or the methods of manufacture (where unique to the Manhattan District) of such items; also, the material itself, as described above.
(2) Documents containing complete uncoded flow sheets, diagrams, or reactions, including specific pressures, temperatures, voltages, rates, formulae, and other operating details not described in the Smyth Report, specifically related to a critical step in the preparation, processing, separation, or purification of basic feed materials, and principal end products.
(3) Documents containing unique nuclear, physical, and chemical characteristics of end products, and critical process materials (including, for example, barrier material and neutron moderators), and also details of the manufacture (where unique to the District) of such materials. Also the products and materials themselves when they disclosed such information.
(4) Documents showing the meaning of a name or symbol used as a code, where the code name or symbol refers to matters classifiable as SECRET.
(5) Documents pointing out the existence of unique operational or production hazards, their nature and solution.
(6) Details pertaining to features of special shipping containers, routes and schedules of shipments of Secret materials, except as classified TOP SECRET.
Confidential Information The Confidential classification level “shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.” All of the important terms used by the EO to describe the Confidential classification level have been defined earlier in this chapter.
EO 11652 provided no examples of Confidential information. The NSC regulations give no examples for the Confidential classification category other than to state that “it must be reasonably expected that unauthorized disclosure of the [Confidential] material would cause damage to the national security.”17 DoD guidance gives the following examples of Confidential information:
The compromise of information that indicates strength of ground, air, and naval forces in the United States and overseas areas; disclosure of technical information used for training, maintenance, and inspection of classified munitions of war; revelation of performance characteristics, test data, design, and production data on munitions of war.18
Earlier DoD guidance gave the following examples of Confidential information:
(1) Operational and battle reports which contain information of value to the enemy.
(2) Intelligence reports.
(4) Information which indicates strength of our ground, air and naval forces in United States and overseas areas, identity or composition of units, or quantity of specific items of equipment pertaining thereto. (A defense classification is normally required, if such information reflects the overall strength figures or quantities of weapons whose characteristics are themselves classified, or additional factors necessitate security protection.)
(5) Unless a higher classification is needed to protect information relating to a particular munition:
(a) Documents and manuals containing technical information used for training, maintenance, and inspection of classified munitions of war.
(b) Research, development, production, and procurement of munitions of war.
(c) Performance characteristics, test data, design, and production data on munitions of war.
(6) Operational and tactical doctrine.
(7) Mobilization plans.19
The MED Security Manual mentioned above also gave examples of what constituted Confidential information.20
(1) Documents containing specific design details (diagrammatic or descriptive) of incomplete components of basic or key equipment, apparatus, instruments, or machinery employed in a critical stage of the processing and production of end products, or the methods of manufacture (where unique to the District) of such items. Also, the material itself, as described above.
(2) Documents containing incomplete uncoded flow sheets, diagrams or reactions; or specific pressures, temperatures, voltages, rates, formulae, and other operating details related to a non-critical step in the preparation, processing, separation, or purification of basic feed materials, and principal end products where not described in the Smyth Report.
(3) Documents containing unique physical and chemical characteristics of special materials not pertaining to the product material or process but used to overcome operational problems unique to the District. Also critical details of the manufacture of such materials and the materials themselves. (Examples: special lubricants, seals, and solvents.)
(4) Documents showing the meaning of code names or symbols used to refer to Confidential information.
(5) Documents relating to special investigations, clearance, or assignment of personnel who will have knowledge of, or access to, classified information wherein adverse information is reflected.
(6) Details pertaining to features of special shipping containers, routes and schedules of shipments of confidential materials.
A major distinction between Secret and Confidential information in the MED appeared to be that Secret documents gave the entire description of a process or of key equipment, etc., whereas Confidential documents revealed only fragmentary information (not the critical information). Also, Secret information pertained to details of critical steps or process parameters, whereas Confidential information pertained to similar parameters for noncritical steps or process parameters.
Table 1. contains examples of the effects of disclosure of Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret information for several types of NSI. These examples were summarized from information given previously in this chapter.
PRINCIPLES FOR ASSIGNING CLASSIFICATION LEVELS
The more important that an item of information is to national security (the more damage that would be caused by its disclosure), the higher should be the classification level of that information. Determining the net damage to the nation caused by disclosure of information was described in Chapter 6. The magnitude of that damage will determine the classification level that should be assigned to the information under consideration for classification.
The amount of damage caused by disclosure of information will be the primary determinant of the classification level to be assigned to that information, but the imminence of that damage might also be a factor in determining its classification level. That is, the shorter the time period between the time that the information is known to an adversary and the time that the adversary can use that information to our detriment, the higher should be the classification level of that information.
The extent of dissemination of classified information might also be a factor in determining that information’s classification level. The probability of unauthorized disclosure of classified information increases with an increase in the number of persons who know that information (see Appendix G). Consequently, it might not be reasonable to assign a Top Secret classification level to information that, for example, is expected to be given to 10,000 persons. Such extensive dissemination would proportionately increase the probability of unauthorized disclosure of that information. Therefore, the expected extent of dissemination of classified information should probably be a factor in determining the classification level to be assigned to that information.
Classification Because of Effort Required to Get the Information
Sometimes, as was discussed in earlier chapters, information such as scientific or technical information is classified even though an adversary could reasonably be expected to get that same information through its own, straightforward, independent efforts. This information is classified to make an adversary use its resources to get this information, resources that it might otherwise use to our detriment. This type of information does not represent any scientific or technological breakthrough. This type of information can be acquired by competent technical persons using equipment that is readily available or easily constructed. Since such information is relatively easily available and since there is very little, if anything, that can be done to prevent an adversary from obtaining this information through its own efforts, the consequences of an adversary’s getting this information can hardly be termed serious enough to warrant a classification level of Secret or higher. Therefore, this type of information should generally not be classified higher than Confidential.
Reasonable Doubt About Classification Level
When there is reasonable doubt about the appropriate classification level for NSI, EO 12356 requires that the information be safeguarded at the higher level pending a determination by an original classification authority.21 However, since the current discussion is about original classification authorities determining classification levels, it is not clear what an original classifier should do if there is uncertainty about the classification level. The strong implication is that the information should be classified at the higher level until more details are obtained on the damage that could be caused by disclosure of the information. Since there are no other presumptions favoring a lower classification level,* this would seem to be a reasonable principle.
- In Chapter 6, reasons were given for presuming that non-atomic energy information should remain unclassified if there was reasonable doubt about whether it should be classified as NSI.
Classification Levels for Scientific or Technical Information
Top Secret Scientific or Technical Information
According to examples provided by current NSC regulations (see above), only scientific or technological developments vital to the national security should be assigned the Top Secret classification level. Disclosure of this information “reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.”3 Vital is defined as follows:
Vital — of the utmost importance; essential to the continued existence, vigor, efficiency, independence, or value of something expressed or implied; taking priority in consideration over other factors or elements.4
The other key words used to describe the Top Secret classification level were defined earlier.
The 1964 DoD classification instructions referred to earlier in this chapter contained an example for Top Secret scientific or technical information, which was as follows:
Vital information concerning radically new and extremely important equipment (munitions of war), such as nuclear weapons, atomic weapons stockpile data, and any other munitions of comparable importance the scientific or technological development aspects of which are vital to national defense.22
It would be expected that only rarely would classified scientific or technological information be place in the Top Secret level.
Secret Scientific or Technical Information
According to examples provided by current NSC regulations (see above), only “significant scientific or technological developments relating to national security” should be classified at the Secret level. “Significant” has the following definition:4
Significant — having meaning; full of import; having or likely to have influence or effect; deserving to be considered; important; weighty; notable.
The previously cited 1964 DoD instructions on information to be classified at the Secret level indicated that the following scientific and technical information should be classified at the Secret level:
Particulars of scientific or research projects which incorporate new technological developments or techniques having direct military applications of vital importance to the national defense.
Specific details or data relating to new materials or important modifications of materials which reveal significant military advances or new technological developments having direct military application of vital importance to the national defense.23
Comparing this description with the previously given DoD description for Top Secret scientific or technical information indicates that both levels are concerned with developments vital to national defense. One difference between the two descriptions is that Secret information includes new technological developments, materials, etc., whereas to be Top Secret the information has to concern radically new and extremely important munitions of war such at atomic weapons.
Confidential Scientific or Technical Information
Neither EO 11652 nor the NSC regulations mentioned earlier provide specific guidance with respect to classifying scientific or technical information at the Confidential level. The only guidance provided by EO 12356 is that which is used to define the Confidential level — that unauthorized disclosure of Confidential information reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. The previously mentioned 1964 DoD instruction seems to consider that if scientific and technical information related to research and development of munitions of war is not classified at the Top Secret or Secret level, then it should be classified at the Confidential level. That instruction included the following guidance regarding what should be classified at the Confidential level.
Unless a higher classification is needed to protect information relating to a particular munition:
(a) Documents and manuals containing technical information used for training, maintenance, and inspection of classified munitions of war.
(b) Research, development, production, and procurement of munitions of war.
(c) Performance characteristics, test data, design, and production data on munitions of war.24
That guidance is rather broad and encompasses a lot of information.
A 1970 DoD report on the effects of classification on scientific and technical information on research, development, production, and deployment of weapon systems stated the following with respect to the use of the Confidential classification level:
The Task Force was inclined to the view that the classification category [sic] of “Confidential,” as applied at present to research and development not bearing immediately on field problems of military interest, is probably useless, or even detrimental, for it prevents normal diffusion of information without providing a really effective barrier to leaks. It probably would be much more realistic to confine this category of classification to matters bearing on military plans and readiness.25
The comment that the Confidential category did not provide a “really effective barrier to leaks” is rather puzzling with respect to classification matters. If the Confidential category was not effective, then that ineffectiveness may have been caused by inadequate enforcement by security of improper handling of documents or materials in that category, rather than due to improper placement of information in that category.
A similar comment about the ineffectiveness of the Confidential classification category would definitely not be applicable to classified scientific or technical atomic energy information (RD and FRD) classified at the Confidential level by DOE. In practice, DOE uses essentially only the Confidential and Secret classification levels for RD and FRD. DOE very rarely assigns a Top Secret classification level to scientific or technical RD or FRD. The protection of Confidential Restricted Data (CRD) and Confidential Formerly Restricted Data (CFRD) is taken very seriously within DOE, and information is not assigned the Confidential classification level unless it truly warrants classification.
If the balancing process described in Chapter 6 results in a conclusion that disclosure of the information will cause net damage to the nation, and the reasonably expected damage is not great enough to warrant a Top Secret or Secret classification level under the criteria given above, then the Confidential level should be assigned to the classified information.
- Executive Classification of Information — Security Classification Problems Involving Exemption (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. �552), Committee on Government Operations, H.R. 93–221, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1973, p. 100.
2. Executive Order 12356, Fed. Reg., 47, 14874 (Apr. 6, 1982). Hereafter cited as “EO 12356.”
3. EO 12356, �1.1(a)(1).
4. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged, Merriam-Webster, Inc., Springfield, Mass., 1986.
5. EO 11652, Fed. Reg., 37, 5209 (Mar. 10, 1972). Hereafter cited as “EO 11652.”
6. EO 111652, �1(A).
7. 32 CFR Part 2101.53(b).
8. U.S. Department of Defense, Information Security Program Regulation, DoD 5200.1-R, Chap. I, �1–501, June 1986. Hereafter cited as “DoD 5200.1-R.”
9. U.S. Department of Defense, Security Classification of Official Information, Instruction 5210.47, Appendix A, Part I, Dec. 31, 1964. Hereafter cited as “DoD 5210.47.”
10. EO 12356, �1.1(a)(2).
11. EO 11652, �1(B).
12. 32 CFR Part 2101.53 (c).
13. DoD 5200.1-R, Chap. I, �1–502.
14. DoD 5210.47, Appendix A, Part II.
15. U.S. Engineer Office, Manhattan District, Security Manual, Nov. 26, 1945, pp. 20–21. Hereafter cited as “MED Security Manual.”
16. EO 12356, �1.1(a)(3).
17. 32 CFR Part 2101.53 (d).
18. DoD 5200.1-R, Chap. I, �1–503.
19. DoD 5210.47, Appendix A, Part III.
20. MED Security Manual, pp. 21–22.
21. EO 12356, �1.1(c). See also the Information Security Oversight Office “Directive No. 1,” Fed. Reg., 47, 27836 (June 25, 1982), �2001.1(b)(2); 32 CFR 2001.1(b)(2).
22. DoD 5210.47, Appendix A, Part I, Item 7.
23. DoD 5210.47, Appendix A, Part II, Items 6 and 7.
24. DoD 5210.47, Appendix A, Part III, Item 5.
25. U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Task Board on Secrecy, F. Seitz, Chmn., Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, July 1, 1970, pp. 10–11.